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Abstract
Core-periphery networks are structures that present a set of central and densely
connected nodes, namely the core, and a set of non-central and sparsely connected
nodes, namely the periphery. The rich-club refers to a set in which the highest degree
nodes show a high density of connections. Thus, a network that displays a rich-club can
be interpreted as a core-periphery network in which the core is made up by a number
of hubs. In this paper, we test the resilience of networks showing a progressively denser
rich-club and we observe how this structure is able to affect the network measures in
terms of both cohesion and efficiency in information flow. Additionally, we consider
the case in which, instead of making the core denser, we add links to the periphery.
These two procedures of core and periphery thickening delineate a decision process in
the placement of new links and allow us to conduct a scenario analysis that can be
helpful in the comprehension and supervision of complex networks under the resilience
perspective. The advantages of the two procedures, as well as their implications, are
discussed in relation to both network efficiency and node heterogeneity.
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1 Introduction
Defined as a system’s ability to adjust its activity to retain its basic functionality when
errors, failures and environmental changes occur [2, 12], resilience is a crucial property of
many networked systems. It has been rapidly tackled by the scientific literature [1, 5] and,
as such, is still considered a topic of great interest [9, 12].
Related to concepts such as robustness, redundancy, vulnerability and sustainability
[23], resilience is considered fundamental for a number of practical approaches that involve
risk assessment in terms of criticalities related to the eventual failure (or removal) of nodes
and links and thus by means of overall systemic tolerance. Indeed, network performances
(especially in terms of routing ability and stability) are directly related to their resilience
and thus to the capabilities of networks in tolerating loss of important elements such as
bridges or hubs. Mainly because of its tangible implications [21, 25, 32, 35], resilience has
been investigated across many different network structures (both synthetic and real) and
there is now knowledge regarding how specific kinds of networks react to specific kinds
of losses [14, 15]. In more detail, since resilience is related to the ability to withstand
deliberate attacks and incidents, studies about this topic have tended to consider a large
variety of structural failures (both induced by attack or naturally occurring) which involve
both specific (i.e. chosen by their properties like the centrality indexes) and random nodes.
Moreover, as resilience is strictly related to the network topology [1, 4], results of the
stress tests are strongly affected by certain structural measures such as density and the
clustering coefficient [11], as well as by the presence of specific substructures like cliques or
dense subgraphs, which are, in general, highly fault-tolerant since the loss of any element
has no disruptive effect on the interaction between the others.
Among those densely tied substructures that seem to be of interest in terms of re-
silience [13, 34], the rich-club is particularly well known [36]. The rich-club is a network
substructure that is observed when hubs are tightly interconnected. It constitutes the ba-
sis for the recognition of the rich-club phenomenon which is, more generally, defined as the
tendency of nodes with a high centrality (usually degree) to form highly interconnected
communities [3]. Furthermore, it can be even interpreted as the core of a core-periphery
network [18], i.e. as the core of a network that shows a set of central and densely connected
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nodes and a set of non-central and sparsely connected nodes.
The rich-club phenomenon has been observed in many different networks [3, 36] and
its importance has been recognized in that it represents an unexpected feature ( i.e. non-
replicated by regular models [7, 36]) of many real systems, which is shown to have a
relevant effect on certain network measures, especially on assortativity and transitivity
[33]. Another important aspect of the rich-club is that, while it is possible to evaluate
its presence for each value of the node degrees, through a specific coefficient properly
normalized over an ensemble of randomized networks [3, 8, 17, 20, 22, 37], it is not possible
to compute its size a priori [20].
Thus, it is commonly assumed that the rich-club is made up of a certain low percentage
of the highest degree nodes [33, 36], whose interconnections are able to strongly affect
a number of structural measures. So, despite the fact that a number of studies have
investigated the rich-club phenomenon and aspects of resilience within the context of
complex networks (like in the case of the Internet [2] and, more recently, of the Darknet
[9]), to the authors’ knowledge these two problems have never been tackled when taking
their conjectured mutual effects into consideration. Indeed, while there have been some
statements about the role of the rich-club in terms of its capacity to increase the network
stability [9], to act as a super traffic hub [36] and to indicate resilience to specific kind of
attacks [29], the literature still lacks of a unique general framework able to explicit the
relationship between the rich-club ordering and the resilience of a network.
Under these circumstances, this paper aims to shed some light on the role of the rich-
club from a resilience perspective by looking at how the presence and the characteristics of
this important substructure are able to affect the network robustness from various points
of view.
For these reasons, we analyze resilience by considering networks in which we manipulate
the set of connections among the highest degree nodes by adding and removing links. By
adopting this strategy we obtain a set of different networks that share the same topology
other than a small subgraph made up of the rich nodes, i.e. we keep the network periphery
while altering the network core. The resilience is tested on the resulting networks by means
of a number of measures related to both efficiency and cohesion: the diameter, the average
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path length, the global efficiency and the global clustering coefficient. The implications of
the rich-club presence in terms of resilience lay the basis for the investigation of a different
rationale in the positioning of new links. Therefore, we modify the previous manipulation
procedure by testing the case in which the same amount of links (which we would add in
order to reach certain rich-club densities) is instead added randomly outside the rich-club.
More specifically, we implement two procedures of either core or periphery thickening
in order to mimic the decision process of a supra agent that, with a limited amount of
resources constituted by the new links, has to engineer the considered system in an efficient
manner. The result of this process will be relevant in understanding where to put new
connections in existing networks, such as new routes in airport networks or new cables
in power grids or the Internet, being consistent with a set of efficiency criteria that are
here represented by the network measures used in the evaluation of resilience. Lastly, our
results allow room for certain considerations at different levels, which will be useful in
better comprehending and supervising networks that display the rich-club structure.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes rich-club ordering and network
resilience; Section 3 shows the simulation setting; Section 4 displays the simulation results
and analysis; Section 5 presents discussions and conclusions.
2 Rich-Club Ordering and Network Resilience
Rich-club ordering is an important topological property firstly observed in the case of
technological networks and, in more detail, in the case of the Internet at Autonomous
Systems (AS) level [36]. Recognition of this phenomenon is conducted via a comparison
between the number of links among the rich nodes and the number of links they might
possibly share. In doing so, it is possible to evaluate the density of the subgraph made up
of such nodes. The rich nodes are those that have a degree higher than a certain threshold
k and a rich-club occurs when such nodes are more densely interconnected than expected,
i.e. they have more interconnections with respect to the average of the interconnections
found among the same nodes in an ensemble of rewired networks [3].
However, as the threshold value of degree k for which we may observe the rich-club is
unknown, the size of the rich-club is therefore assumed, in accordance with the empirical
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evidence, to be around the 1% of the network nodes [20, 33, 36]. The empirical evidence of
small rich-club size is present in many different domains from technological [37] to social
[19] and biological networks where, especially in neuroscience [28, 30, 31], the investigation
of the rich-club phenomenon has provided important insights from a brain functionality
perspective.
Thus, while this property has been recognized as relevant, its effect on the network
metrics has been mainly tested for cohesion measures such as the clustering coefficient
and the degree assortativity, and only marginally for path-based measures that should
be, in case of rich-club ordering, more of interest since such measures are associated with
information flow. Indeed, the efficiency of a network is mainly based on path metrics
and it has been shown that the rich-club is an emergent property of certain networks
[8] in which hubs need to be interconnected in order to avoid losses, as in the case of
electric current in power grid networks [8, 26]. In this respect, the knowledge and the
investigation of the rich-club effect on other measures, closer to the concept of distances
among nodes, may be of interest in terms of both static analysis, i.e. in terms of the effect
of a progressively denser rich-club on certain measures, and dynamic analysis, i.e. in
term of resilience. Indeed, the investigation of network resilience can be seen as a what-if
analysis that considers a large set of network topologies and metrics that derive, through
a procedure of nodes and links deletion, from the original one.
Resilience has been traditionally studied in two different cases (or scenarios): error
and attack. By error we mean the random removal of elements; by attack we mean a
removal process that targets specific or crucial elements. Thus, the error case considers
randomness while the attack case is conducted by removing elements with high values
of certain centrality measures in two different ways: sequential and simultaneous [15].
If we consider node removal, in the sequential targeted attack the centrality measures
are computed after each node removal and the node with the greater centrality score is
eliminated; in the simultaneous targeted attack the centrality measures are computed at
the beginning and the order of the nodes to be removed is known before the procedure
starts. In the previous cases and even in the case of error, the basic properties and effect
of the removal procedures are well known in the literature for both real and synthetic
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networks [14, 15]. For instance, it is known that scale-free networks are particularly
resilient in case of error and particularly vulnerable in case of attack due to the variance
of their degree distribution, i.e. because of a topology that includes hubs [1]. Obviously,
many other cases could be mentioned, but none of them would include, to our knowledge,
a clear perspective on the role of the rich-club in such networks. Thus, under these
circumstances and given the relevance of both network resilience and rich-club ordering
from a number of perspectives, it is important to extend the current knowledge as deriving
from the literature to the case of networks displaying a rich-club structure.
3 Simulation Setting
We analyze resilience by considering undirected and unweighted scale-free networks G,
with N = 5000 nodes and mean degree value 〈k〉 = 6. We manipulate the connections
among the top 1% nodes of highest degree by adding/removing links in order to create
subgraphs (cores) with various density values. In adopting this strategy we are able to
obtain different networks sharing the same topology other than the subgraph made up of
the rich nodes.
As shown in Figure 1, the obtained densities of the induced subgraphs are d =
{0, 0.09, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where d = 0.09 is the density, averaged over ten instances, of
the subgraph made up of rich nodes in the original (i.e. non-manipulated) network. This
last case represents the default case among the different generated networks. In the six
different scenarios we test the robustness of the network to node removal in case of error
and in case of simultaneous degree-targeted attack. The choice of this kind of attack (in-
stead of the sequential degree-targeted attack in which the centrality scores are computed
at each iteration) is motivated by the fact that our aim is to observe the effect of the
rich-club, as realized by our manipulation, on certain measures that characterize the con-
sidered network. Indeed, with the simultaneous degree-targeted attack we know a priori
the nodes that are going to be removed, while in case of sequential degree targeted attack
the ensemble of rich nodes may be subjected to variations due to the re-computation of
the centrality scores at every iteration.
After the removal of each node, we compute a number of different metrics that refer
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Figure 1: Process of link addition/removal of the subgraph made up of the highest degree
nodes in order to reach different density values.
to aspects of both information flow and network cohesion. The considered measures are
global in the sense that they are computed on the whole network and not on the single
node, and they are: the diameter, the average path length, the global network efficiency
and the global clustering coefficient (see Table 1). The obtained results are averaged over
10 replicas of the resilience tests and on 10 different networks realized using the same
degree sequence (i.e. the same list of node degrees).
For all the considered cases we focus on the initial effect of a denser/sparser rich-club
on the measures from above and on its effect throughout the process of node removal.
Additionally, we test the case in which the same amount of links that we would add in
order to reach certain rich-club densities are instead added randomly outside the rich-club.
In other words, by recalling the core/periphery nature of networks that display rich-club
ordering, we test two procedures of either core or periphery thickening. The comparison
between the two procedures allows us to perform a scenario analysis and to simulate a
decision process of a supra agent that, with a limited amount of resources (the links), has
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Measure Definition Formula
Diameter (D) The length of the shortest path between
the most distanced nodes.
D = max
i,j∈G
dij
Average path length (APL) The mean of all the shortest paths between
all couples of nodes.
APL = 1
N(N−1)
∑
i,j∈G
dij
Global network efficiency (E) A measure of how efficiently the network
exchanges information.
E = 1
N(N−1)
∑
i 6=j∈G
1
dij
Global clustering coefficient (C) The average of the local clustering coeffi-
cients Ci of all individual nodes.
C = 1
N
∑
i∈G
Ci
Table 1: Short glossary of metrics computed during simulations (note that dij is the
shortest path between nodes i and j in G).
to engineer the considered system (the network) in an efficient (from the point of view of
the described measures) manner.
It is worth to adding at this point that the two indicated procedures i) to add links
within the rich-club, and ii) to add links outside the rich-club, alter the degree distribution
(and the degree sequence) of the considered networks. These alterations depend on many
factors, including the number of links to be added and their location, as well the consequent
size and density of the rich-club. Placement of the new links has an effect on the different
portions of the degree sequence, meaning the two procedures end up turning the network
into either a more irregular or regular structure. We illustrate this process of degree
sequence modification by plotting the variance 〈k〉2 of the node degrees (see Figure 2), i.e.
the degree-related network heterogeneity [16, 27], in the described cases.
We summarize the described simulation procedures as shown in Table 2 where column
2 is the required local density for the rich-club subgraph, column 3 is the average values of
links to be added in order to obtain such a density, column 4 reports the number of links
removed or added randomly in the network core, while column 5 highlights the number
of links that are randomly removed or added in the network periphery. Note that links
are reported as averages over ten instances, while in the network manipulation each of the
ten instances were modified with the proper number of links. Note also that in the second
setting the default rich-club is preserved together with its density, since we are adding
links in the network periphery.
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Figure 2: Variance of the degree 〈k〉2 after the procedure of core and periphery thickening.
All results are averaged on 10 instances.
Data processing, the network analysis and all simulations were conducted using the
software R [24] with the igraph package [6].
4 Simulation results
4.1 Core Thickening
Analyzing Figures 3 and 4 we notice that the rich-club positively alters the initial statistics
of the network and that its presence is not highly relevant with respect to simultaneous
degree-targeted attack in networks that display a power-law degree distribution. In more
detail, when we take into account scale-free networks, we observe that the overall trend of
the considered measures is very close to that of the non-manipulated scale-free networks;
in our case the curve with density d = 0.09 and related to Scenario 2. Indeed, the presence
of the rich-club has an effect mainly on the initial values of the centrality measures and, in
decreasing order of impact, on: the global clustering coefficient, the global efficiency, the
average path length and the diameter. The effect on all these metrics is amplified further
by the density of the rich-club; thus, the higher its density the higher the overall centrality
9
Rich-club density Links Core thickening Periphery thickening
Scenario 1 drc = 0 m1 = 111 Remove m1 links Remove m1 links
Scenario 2 drc = 0.09 m2 = 0 Default case Default case
Scenario 3 drc = 0.25 m3 = 194 Add m3 links Add m3 links
Scenario 4 drc = 0.50 m4 = 500 Add m4 links Add m4 links
Scenario 5 drc = 0.75 m5 = 807 Add m5 links Add m5 links
Scenario 6 drc = 1 m6 = 1113 Add m6 links Add m6 links
Table 2: Simulation scenarios for core and periphery thickening.
value. This is true in particular for the global clustering coefficient case in which, called
nrc the number of nodes of the rich-club, are progressively generated up to
(
nrc
3
)
triangles,
i.e. the number of triangles displayed by a complete subgraph of size nrc.
As previously mentioned, the effect of the rich-club is relatively strong for all the other
centrality measures other than the diameter. This is because the clustering coefficient,
the efficiency and the average path length are measures averaged over all the network
nodes (while the diameter is a more extremal measure), and are thus affected by the
centrality values retained by the rich-club. This bias is especially evident in scale-free
networks whose heterogeneity in the degree distribution contributes to phenomena like the
friendship paradox, which holds if the average degree of nodes in the network is smaller
than the average degree of their neighbors [10].
The origin of the paradox is attributed to the existence of hub nodes and to the
variance of the degree that contributes in altering the mean values of the degree over
the neighborhoods of the nodes. Therefore, the observed deviations of the computed
measures may be motivated by similar reasonings if we further consider the increase in
the degree sequence variance induced by our manipulations. In summary, exacerbating
the interconnections among hubs (i.e. to create progressively denser cores) has a relevant
effect on the centrality measures averaged over the network nodes, but has no relevant
effect in terms of resilience to a degree-targeted attack.
In the case of error the rich-club in Figure 5, according to its density, provides a very
high fault tolerance to the considered system. Indeed, the nodes that constitute the core
make up a low portion (1%) of the whole number of nodes and are thus less likely to be
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randomly removed. The low probability of hubs removal has an effect on the resilience of
the system, which is guaranteed for all the observed measures. For instance, the diameter
doubles only when about 75% of the elements are removed, and the global clustering
coefficient is kept during the simulations since the majority of triangles are located within
the rich-club.
Figure 6 focuses on the area of the rich-club where the behavior of the considered
measures follows a straight line, indicating a certain network stability for similar reasons
as those discussed before.
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Figure 3: Resilience for simultaneous attack simulations with progressive manipulation of
the number of links in the network core. The dashed line is placed in correspondence to
the rich-club size. All results are averaged over 10 instances.
4.2 Periphery Thickening
As shown in Figure 7, networks with a denser periphery are more resilient to targeted
attacks than networks with a denser core. When we look at the diameter and at the
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Figure 4: Resilience for simultaneous attack simulations with progressive manipulation of
number of links in the network core; magnification of the area of Figure 3 in which lays
the rich-club. The dashed line is placed in correspondence to the rich-club size. All are
results averaged over 10 instances.
average path length, the peaks related to the two metrics occur in correspondence to a
higher percentage of removed nodes and, differently from the case of core thickening, the
number of added links has a role in determining the robustness to targeted removal. This
observation is consistent with the fact that, by adding links to the network periphery,
we decrease the degree sequence variance, meaning we somehow regularize the considered
networks. The obtained results recall the resilience to simultaneous degree-targeted attack
in case of degree homogeneous networks [5]. Additionally, the global clustering coefficient
is much lower as links are not placed in order to thicken a small subgraph (the rich-club),
consequently the likelihood to close a connected triple (to create a new triangle) is lower.
Even in the case of global efficiency we observe a proportionately more resilient behavior
across the number of added links.
12
010
20
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Percentage of nodes
D
ia
m
et
er
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Percentage of nodes
Cl
us
te
rin
g 
Co
eff
ic
ie
nt
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Percentage of nodes
Av
er
a
ge
 P
a
th
 L
en
gt
h
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Percentage of nodes
Eff
ic
ie
nc
y
Density
Sc.1
Sc.2
Sc.3
Sc.4
Sc.5
Sc.6
Figure 5: Resilience for simultaneous error simulations with progressive manipulation of
the number of links in the network core. The dashed line is placed in correspondence to
the rich-club size. All results are averaged over 10 instances.
In the case of error (see Figure 8), the periphery thickening procedure leads to results
that are similar to those of core thickening except for two considerations. The clustering
coefficient is much lower, for the reasons discussed before, and the curves relating to differ-
ent scenarios have similar and almost stacked trends; in other words, they refer to results
that are comparable, despite the number of added links in the various scenarios being
much different. This is because, as we lower the variance of the degree, the contribution
of each node to the considered network metrics tends to be progressively the same.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Herein we discuss the results of the simulations by looking at both their theoretical and
practical meaning and implications. Considering two different perspectives regarding the
results is helpful in better understanding the role of the rich-club in terms of network
13
05
10
15
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015
Percentage of nodes
D
ia
m
et
er
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015
Percentage of nodes
Cl
us
te
rin
g 
Co
eff
ic
ie
nt
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015
Percentage of nodes
Av
er
a
ge
 P
a
th
 L
en
gt
h
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015
Percentage of nodes
Eff
ic
ie
nc
y
Density
Sc.1
Sc.2
Sc.3
Sc.4
Sc.5
Sc.6
Figure 6: Resilience for simultaneous error simulations with progressive manipulation of
the number of links in the network core; magnification of the area of Figure 5 in which
lays the rich-club. The dashed line is placed in correspondence to the rich-club size. All
results are averaged over 10 instances.
resilience and in providing insights into the demanding task of network supervision and
engineering.
If we consider attack tolerance, the rich-club thickening initially guarantees a greater
global cohesion predominantly in the core, as well as an overall better performance when
removing the number of nodes below the 1% threshold. Thus, the network provides better
performance when only a few high-degree nodes are removed. The main drawback is that
this high proportion of cohesion measure is retained by the nodes that are actually the
most likely to be removed in the case of an attack.
Considering attack tolerance once again, the periphery thickening has the main advan-
tage in that it alters the network into a more resilient structure, which is able to keep its
properties in the long run. This means that the network tends to maintain stable values of
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Figure 7: Resilience for simultaneous attack simulations with progressive manipulation of
the number of links in the network periphery. The dashed line is placed in correspondence
to the rich-club size. All results are averaged over 10 instances.
the performance measures when a high portion of the nodes is removed, since in this case
the paths tend to be preserved. These aspects of network resilience are mainly regulated
by the manipulation of the network degree-related heterogeneity (i.e by the manipula-
tion of the variance of node degrees) that we perform through the procedures of core and
periphery thickening.
In the case of error, the networks that display a dense core provide overall better
performances that improve accordingly with the core density. Indeed, the trend of the
different curves in the cases of core and periphery thickening are similar, but the former
case provides also a better initial global efficiency and a higher value of clustering that
lasts throughout the simulations.
Thus, if by looking at the simulations, a decision maker would evaluate where to
put a set amount of links with respect to random node failure, the logical conclusion
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Figure 8: Resilience for simultaneous error simulations with progressive manipulation of
the number of links in the network periphery. The dashed line is placed in correspondence
to the rich-club size. All results are averaged over 10 instances.
would be that it is better to increase the density of the network core and to increase
that density as much as possible (compatibly with the amount of available links). The
observations in cases of attack should be of different nature and should be weighted on
an eventual foresight about the magnitude of possible attacks to the network. Indeed,
if massive attacks on the network are possible, the periphery thickening (i.e. a network
homogenization) should be preferred while if there is a higher likelihood of few hubs being
removed, the core thickening (i.e. a network heterogenization), should be preferred.
In other words, considering for instance the diameter, that is an extremal measure of
communication, in the case of periphery thickening the curves have both shifted peaks and
a lower slope according to the network density. It means that the network performance
degenerates after a greater number of removed nodes and the considered performance
measures are directly proportional to the network density. Indeed, for a fixed percentage
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of removed nodes the diameter is smaller as the density grows.
The concepts of attack magnitude and attack likelihood constitute two important
aspects, related to risk profile of the network under observation that should be considered
when different strategies of link addition are taken into account.
However, these conclusions could be further discussed especially in case of resilience
to massive attacks provided by networks treated with the periphery thickening procedure.
Indeed, in case where about the 25% of the network nodes (or more) are lost, issues
regarding the performance could be discarded in favor of other issues regarding network
recovery and catastrophes management. Thus, a decision maker may be not that interested
in the performance measures from above once that the system has been dramatically
disrupted. Using this consideration as a baseline, we may argue that once the percentage
of removed nodes has passed such a right-shifted threshold, an advantage in terms of
resilience is not particularly realistic due to the fact that any benefit can be only obtained
once a loss of significantly large dimensions occurs. This may lead us to conclude that the
core thickening procedure, i.e. the increase of the rich-club density, has to be considered
as a practically better procedure to follow in order to enhance the network resilience.
In summary, the simulations highlight the relationship between the rich-club size and
the attack magnitude, indicating that if the former is greater than the latter then a
reasonable policy would be to perform a core thickening strategy.
Two aspects have to be considered further: on the one hand, the core thickening strat-
egy provides a better resilience to errors and to small attacks (to hubs) but on the other
this procedure, in accordance with the size and the density of the rich-club, exacerbates
the degree-related asymmetry and thus entails a problem of equity of nodes that is invari-
ably of interest in a number of real networks. When the attack magnitude exceeds the
rich-club size then simulations suggest a strategy of periphery thickening.
Therefore, a decision maker has to face controversial decisions regarding the adoption of
a strategy that is affected by two parameters, the rich-club size and the attack magnitude,
which are two measures generally difficult to obtain and foresee. This reinforces the notion
that a better understanding of the network structure and of the rich-club is relevant,
especially when coupled with other concepts related to the risk profile and to the type of
17
system that is taken into account.
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